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Social security is the mainstay of the economic security of 
the elderly. In 1982 the aged, the disabled, their dependents 
and survivors will receive $156 billion in cash benefits from 
the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) 
program and another $34 billion of medical care under the 
Hospital Insurance (HI) program. Approximately 90 percent 
of persons aged 65 and over are social security recipients, 
and for two-thirds of these recipients social security benefits 
account for more than half of total income. 1 With such enor 
mous dependence on social security, any significant change 
in the program could affect the work and retirement patterns 
of older people.
In recent years, workers and beneficiaries alike have begun 
to question whether the system can continue to provide its 
current level of support. The widespread concern is a 
response to the repeated short-run financial crises and to the 
large deficits projected after the turn of the century as the 
baby boom retires. Confidence in the program can be 
restored only by bringing revenues and costs into balance so 
that the immediate shortfall is eliminated and the financial 
integrity of the system is insured for the long run. This paper 




I. The Social Security Program Today
In 1982, the social security program covers 90 percent of 
the working population, including the self-employed. At 
present, the only significant categories of workers excluded 
from the program are civilian employees of the federal 
government under a retirement system of their own, 30 per 
cent of state and local government workers, low-paid or very 
irregularly employed farm and domestic workers, and un 
paid family workers. Railroad employees are also not 
covered directly, but their plan is thoroughly integrated with 
social security.
The social security system consists of three programs 
which are financed through separate trust funds. The Old- 
Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program, which pays 
benefits to retired workers, their dependents and survivors, 
is the largest program and will dispense $138 billion in 
benefits to almost 32 million beneficiaries in 1982 (see table 
1). The Disability Insurance (DI) program, which pays 
benefits to disabled workers and their dependents, will pay 
$18 billion to roughly 4 million beneficiaries in 1982. The 
third program, Hospital Insurance (HI) or Medicare, pays 
benefits to workers covered by OASDI and the railroad 
retirement program. Benefit payments from this fund will be 
$34 billion in 1982.
Benefits Provisions
Old-age benefits are payable at age 65 to fully insured 
workers, that is, to workers who have one quarter of earn 
ings in covered employment for each year since 1950 (or, if 
later, age 21) and the age of 62. Early retirement is possible 
as early as age 62 with reduced benefits. Disability benefits 
are payable to workers who have one quarter of coverage be 
tween 1950 (or age 21) and the onset of the disability.
Table 1
Benefits and Beneficiaries under Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), 

























































SOURCES: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 1982 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of 
the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), Table 20, p. 51; Table 22, p. 
54; Table 28, p. 65; Table A3, p. 84; Table A4, p. 86; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 1982 
Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), Table 6, p. 29; U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Division of Medicare Cost Analysis, unpublished data, 
a. This figure represents both aged and disabled beneficiaries. As of July 1,1973 hospital insurance protection was extended to disabled persons 
entitled to monthly benefit payments under social security because of their disability.
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The monthly benefits awarded to retired and disabled 
workers are computed in three stages. The first is the calcula 
tion of the worker's average indexed monthly earnings 
(AIME). To compute this figure, taxable wages in each year 
between 1950 (or age 21) and age 62 are revalued to reflect 
the increases in the average wage level and then the revalued 
earnings are averaged over the period, excluding five years of 
lowest earnings.
The second stage involves the calculation of the worker's 
primary insurance amount (PIA) the benefit payable to a 
fully insured worker retiring at age 65. In 1982 this amount is 
determined by applying the following three bracket formula 
to the worker's AIME:
90 percent of the first $230 of AIME
32 percent of AIME between $230 and $1,388
15 percent of AIME over $1,388
Since the formula multiplies each successive increment of the 
worker's AIME by a declining percentage, low-wage workers 
receive a higher percentage of their pre-retirement earnings 
in benefits than high-wage workers. To maintain the pro- 
gressivity and to insure that the average worker in each suc 
cessive cohort receives the same replacement rate (benefit as 
a percent of pre-retirement earnings), the bend points in the 
benefit formula, that is, the amounts $230 and $1,388, are 
increased each year to reflect the average increase in wages in 
employment covered by social security.
The third stage in the benefit calculation is the determina 
tion of the actual benefit paid. This amount usually depends 
on the relation of the wage earner to the individual drawing 
the benefit and the age at which he claims it. A fully insured 
worker retiring at 65 receives a monthly benefit equal to 100 
percent of his primary insurance amount; however, a worker 
can retire as early as 62, with an actuarial reduction in 
benefits of 5/9 of 1 percent for each month before the age of
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65. A dependent spouse, a child, or dependent grandchild 
receives a benefit of up to 50 percent of the worker's primary 
insurance amount. If the worker dies, the widow or widower 
receives 100 percent of his primary insurance amount, while 
a surviving child or grandchild receives 75 percent. 
Dependents and survivors can also claim reduced benefits 
earlier than 65. 2
Since social security payments are meant to replace earn 
ings lost because of retirement or disability, the amount of 
earned income a person can receive while collecting social 
security benefits is limited until he reaches 72. This limit is 
known as the retirement, or earnings, test and is indexed to 
keep pace with the level of wages. For 1982, a beneficiary 
can earn up to $6,000 annually with no reduction in benefits. 
After that, a dollar of benefits is withheld for each $2 of 
earnings over $6,000. 3
Social Security Taxes
The social security system is financed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis. Payroll tax contributions from the 115 million covered 
workers finance the benefits for the 36 million retired and 
disabled workers and their dependents and survivors. In 
1982, the tax rate for retirement, survivors and disability in 
surance is 5.4 percent each for the employee and employer 
on the first $32,400 of wage income, with the ceiling schedul 
ed to rise automatically with the wage level. Hospital in 
surance contributions raise the overall payroll tax rate to 6.7 
percent each for the employee and employer.
Since social security benefits are funded essentially by the 
current flow of payroll taxes, the trust funds are designed 
only to provide a buffer against brief unanticipated 
economic fluctuations. The funds usually hold substantially 
less than one year's benefits, but a small trust fund should 
not be a source of concern in a social insurance program. A
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private pension plan must have sufficient assets to meet all 
prior and current commitments because it cannot be certain 
of receiving future premiums. In contrast, the social security 
program, which relies on the government's tax powers to 
meet its obligations, can continue to levy taxes on future 
generations of workers to pay social security taxes. 
However, pay-as-you-go financing can lead to short-run 
problems if economic fluctuations adversely affect receipts 
or outlays. Long-run financing problems can also arise if the 
size of the beneficiary population increases relative to the 
working population. The social security system now faces 
both of these difficulties.
II. Financing Social Security: An Overview
The trustees of the social security program each year 
prepare a report on the condition of and prospects for the 
OASI, DI and HI funds, both in the near and distant future. 4 
Figure 1 compares the cost of the combined OASI and DI 
funds measured as a percentage of covered payrolls with the 
scheduled contribution rates for the employer and employee. 
The projections are based on the more pessimistic of the two 
central assumptions, II-B, in the trustees' 1982 report, and 
are shown through 2060, the end of the period for which of 
ficial estimates are available. 3
The easiest way to understand the OASDI financing situa 
tion is to divide the figure into three separate time 
periods 1982-1990, 1990-2014, and 2014-2060. In the first 
period, assuming a continuation of current law, OASDI has 
a considerable shortfall. Between now and 1985, expen 
ditures substantially exceed income. Present law provides for 
borrowing from the hospital insurance fund during 1982, but 
without a continuation of the borrowing provision or addi 
tional income of some other source, the OASI fund would 
not be able to pay benefits after mid-1983. The scheduled
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Figure 1 
Estimated OASDI Costs as Percent of Payroll
and Scheduled Tax Rates 
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SOURCE: 1982 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old Age and Sur 
vivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (GPO, 1982), Table 27, p. 64. 
a. Under Intermediate II-B assumptions, the ultimate percentage rates of increase for fer 
tility, real wages and CPI are 2.1, 1.5 and 4.0 respectively.
204
1985 increase in the contribution rate brings the income and 
expenditure lines closer together, but the OASDI program 
continues to run a deficit.
In marked contrast to the first period, the outlook for 
OASDI financing is very favorable for the period 1990-2014. 
Under the II-B assumptions, annual expenditures as a per 
cent of payroll will be less between 1990 and about 2010 than 
they will be in 1990, the beginning of the period. With the 
scheduled 1990 increase in the contribution rate, income in 
creases at the very time expenditures decrease. As a result, 
the trust funds accumulate surpluses rapidly, reaching 177 
percent of the next year's outgo by 2010. 6
The primary reason for the decline in expenditures begin 
ning in 1990 is demographic. The low fertility rates during 
the 1930s are reflected in a considerable reduction in the rate 
of increase in the population over 65 during the 1990s. While 
the average annual increase in the number of persons over 65 
will be about 600,000 during the 1980s, the net increase will 
drop to around 300,000 a year between 1995 and 2005 in 
spite of the improvement in the mortality rate. At the same 
time, the baby boom generation born after World War II 
will be swelling the labor force so that the ratio of workers to 
beneficiaries, now roughly 3 to 1, is estimated to remain 
stable for the next 30 years. With a stable ratio of workers to 
beneficiaries, even modest productivity gains will reduce the 
cost of social security as a percent of payroll.
The third period is characterized by rapidly rising costs as 
the baby boom generation starts to retire. At the same time, 
the growth in the labor force slows markedly, reflecting the 
precipitous decline in the fertility rate which began in the 
mid-1960s. These two factors cause the ratio of workers to 
beneficiaries to decline from its current level of 3 to 1 to a 
ratio of 2 to 1. With a pay-as-you-go system, the decline in 
this crucial ratio produces a substantial increase in costs as a
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percentage of payrolls. Despite the increasing gap between 
costs and revenues, however, the large accumulated trust 
funds are sufficient under the II-B assumptions to carry the 
OASDI program through 2025. 7
Figure 2 compares income and expenditures for the 
Hospital Insurance program from now until the year 2060. 
Because of the great uncertainty about the nature of the 
hospital system in the distant future, the Trustees tradi 
tionally have made cost estimates for HI for only 25 years as 
compared to 75 years for OASDI. However, projected costs 
for the entire 75-year period have been prepared by the 
Senate Finance Committee. 8 Under the HI program, expen 
ditures consistently exceed contributions as a percentage of 
payroll. With unconstrained growth, which allows the 
hospital cost increases to match the increase in wages, the 
contribution rates scheduled under current law are clearly in 
adequate.
The following discussion of social security financing 
focuses primarily on the cash benefit program, OASDI, but 
it is necessary to consider the financial health of the HI pro 
gram in evaluating alternative proposals for the short run, 
such as an extension of interfund borrowing, and for the 
long run, such as increase in payroll tax contribution rates.
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Figure 2 
Estimates HI Costs as Percent of Payroll
and Scheduled Tax Rates8 
Intermediate Assumption II-B, 1982-2055
1S32 1985 1990 1991 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Calendar Year
SOURCES: 1982 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital In 
surance Trust Fund (GPO, 1982), Table 8, p. 37; Senate, Committee on Finance, Staff 
Data and Materials Related to Social Security Financing, Committee Print, 97 Cong. 1 
Sess. (GPO, September 1981), Table 15, p. 31.
a. Costs for years after 2005 are prepared by Senate Finance Committee and are based on 
the assumption that medical care unit cost increases after the year 2005 will be equal to 
average wage increases in covered employment.
207
III. Short-Run Financing Problems 
and Options: 1982-1990
Under current law the OASI trust fund, the largest of the 
social security trust funds, will be unable to pay all benefits 
on time by July 1983. All three funds, OASI, DI and HI, 
together will be exhausted by the end of 1984. The im 
mediacy of the projected shortfall has caused many to 
characterize the social security program's short-run prob 
lems as catastrophic and the press constantly refers to the im 
pending "bankruptcy" of the system. In fact, the magnitude 
of the deficits forecasted for the next eight years is relatively 
small, less than 4 percent of annual outlays over the period, 
and numerous options are available for restoring solvency. 
This section explores the origins of the current deficits and 
some of the options available for reestablishing financial 
balance.
Origins of the Current Deficits
In 1977 Congress undertook an important restructuring of 
the social security program in order to insure its solvency. 
The congressional action was a response to dire predictions 
in the 1977 Trustees' report regarding both the short-run and 
long-run financing of social security. The report warned that 
the disability fund would be depleted by early 1979 and the 
OASI fund would be empty by the early 1980s. The short- 
run deficits were attributable to the high unemployment and 
inflation that accompanied the 1973-75 recession and to a 
continuing rapid increase in disability beneficiaries that 
would have depleted DI trust fund revenues even without the 
downturn in the economy. In addition, the 1977 report in 
dicated that a significant long term deficit had emerged as a 
result of lower fertility rate assumptions and increasing 
replacement rates (the ratio of benefits to preretirement 
earnings) due to an overindexed benefit formula.
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To restore solvency, the 1977 Amendments changed the 
way benefits were calculated in order to stabilize replacement 
rates, increased the payroll tax contribution rate, and raised 
the taxable earnings base. The legislation also reallocated the 
share of the payroll tax slated for DI trust fund. The prin 
cipal changes in the financing provisions are shown in table 
2. The largest increase in the tax rate occurred in January 
1981, when the rate rose 0.52 percent for both employees and 
employers to a level 0.35 above what it would have been 
without the change in the law. The maximum wage base on 
which the tax is levied also increased substantially. For the 
years 1979 through 1981, the provision for automatic index 
ing of the base to changes in average wages was suspended 
and a series of large ad hoc increases was substituted. The 
consequence of the increases in the rate and base is that the 
maximum tax in 1982 was about 40 percent higher than the 
maximum tax under the old law. In view of the substantial 
increase in revenues and the reduction in benefit growth 
from correcting the overindexing, the Acting Commissioner 
of Social Security predicted that "with the signing of the 
Social Security Amendments of 1977 into law, the Congress 
and the President have assured the financial soundness of the 
social security program for the next 50 years." 9
Less than three years later, however, the Trustees, in their 
1980 report, again warned that as early as mid-1981 the 
OASI trust fund would not be able to pay retirement benefits 
as they came due. The obvious question is what changed in 
the intervening years to so dramatically revise the outlook 
for social security financing during the 1980s. The answer 
lies primarily in the poor performance of the economy.
Table 3 compares the assumptions underlying the 1977 
Trustees' report to actual experience and to the assumptions 
underlying the 1980 Trustees' report. The 1977 projections 
were made on the traditional assumption that the rate of 
wage increase would equal the rate of increase in prices plus
Table 2 
Social Security Financing Provisions Before and After the 1977 Amendments
Tax rates9 (percent)
____Old law____ ___New law___ Taxable base Maximum tax 
















































































































































SOURCES: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 1982 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of
the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), Table E2, p. 105; John Snee
and Mary Ross, "Social Security Amendments of 1977: Legislative History and Summary of Provisions," Social Security Bulletin 41, no. 3
(March 1978), Table 4, p. 18.
a. For employees and employers, each. Tax rates for the self-employed are approximately one and one-half times those for nonself-employed.
b. There is no provision in the "old-law" for the taxable base amount in 1977 or 1978.
c. Amount represents ad hoc increase specified by Social Security Amendments of 1977. O
d. The taxable base amounts will be determined automatically on the basis of the annual increase in average earnings in covered employment.
Table 3
Comparison of Assumptions Underlying Trustees' 1977 Projections 


















































































































































SOURCES: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, 1977 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees 
of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), Table 25, p. 45; U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 1980 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old- 
Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Table 10, p. 41; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social 
Security Administration 1982 A nnual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance 
Trust Funds (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), Table 10, p. 32.
a. The 1980 assumptions are based on the intermediate alternative assumptions in the Trustees Report, 
b. Estimates.
c. The difference between the percentage increase in average annual wages in covered employment and the percentage increase in the annual 
CPI.
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1 or 2 percent for productivity growth. Since the 1977 projec 
tions, however, the traditional relationship between prices 
and wages has been reversed, with price increases exceeding 
wage growth. The projected balance in the trust funds is ex 
tremely sensitive to the assumed values of these economic 
variables. The rate of wage growth approximately deter 
mines the rate at which revenues grow, while the rate of in 
crease in the CPI determines the rate at which benefit expen 
ditures increase, since benefits are indexed to the CPI. 
Moreover, the higher unemployment predicted in the 1980 
report further worsened the financial outlook since it implied 
that fewer people would contribute revenue into the trust 
funds and that more people, finding themselves 
unemployed, would be likely to take an early retirement or 
apply for disability benefits.
Despite the deteriorating economic conditions, however, 
the balance in the DI trust fund increased after 1977, due 
primarily to a tremendous reduction in the rate at which the 
eligible population was granted DI benefits. In 1975 the 
number of disability awards per 1,000 insured workers was 
7.11, and in 1977, when the amendments were passed 
allocating a larger fraction of the combined OASDI tax rate 
to the DI program, the rate was still 6.54. 10 By 1978, 
however, it had fallen to 4.36 and, under the 1980 Trustees' 
intermediate assumptions, was forecasted to remain at about 
that level through 1982.
Since the Trustees sounded the initial alarm in their 1980 
report, the economy has continued to weaken. Two 
legislative changes, however, have extended until July 1983 
the date on which the OASI system will no longer be able to 
pay benefits on a timely basis. The Omnibus Reconciliation 
Act of 1981, which was signed into law on August 13, 1981, 
reduced benefits by about 2 percent through the elimination 
of students' benefits, capping family benefits for disabled 
workers and lowering Medicare costs. 11 Amendments to the
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Omnibus Reconciliation Act, passed on December 29, 1981, 
authorized borrowing among the OASI, DI and HI trust 
funds until January 1983. However, a provision that permits 
borrowing for deficits up to six months in advance will in 
sure sufficient revenues to carry the OASI fund through 
June 1983.
In addition to the legislation that extended the life of the 
OASI fund, the short-run financial health of the HI fund 
was improved by the Medicare provisions included in the 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which the 
President signed into law on August 20, 1982. To increase 
revenues for the HI program, the legislation extends the 
social security hospital insurance tax to federal employees. 
On the expenditure side, the new law substantially restricts 
Medicare reimbursement to hospitals. Over the three-year 
period, fiscal 1983-1985, the Tax Equity Act will increase 
revenues in the HI fund by about $10 billion.
The most recent projections for the short-run status of the 
OASI, DI and HI programs are presented in table 4. These 
projections are based on the 1982 Trustees* II-B assump 
tions, modified to take account of the 7.4 percent cost-of- 
living adjustment awarded in July 1982, the transfers under 
the interfund borrowing provisions, and the HI revenue in 
creases and cost reductions from the Tax Equity Act. The 
obvious question, however, is whether these projections are 
reliable, particularly in view of the past experience with over- 
optimistic assumptions.
Table 5 presents forecasts of the change in the consumer 
price index, the average wage, the real wage differential and 
the unemployment rate from the 1982 Trustees' report and 
three independent forecasters, Chase Econometrics, Data 
Resources, Inc. (DRI) and the Wharton model. The table 
shows that the figures on which the Trustees based their pro 
jections are in the same range as the private forecasters for
Table 4
Estimated Operations of the OASI, DI, HI, and OASDHI Trust Funds 
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, Health Care Financing 
Administration, Bureau of Data Management and Strategy, "Estimated Operations of the OASI, DI and HI Trust Funds Under the Laws 
Amended by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982," mimeographed (September 17, 1982), Table 3, p. 5; U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 1982 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance 
Trust Fund (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), Table 10, p. 39; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 
Summary of the 1982 Annual Reports oftheSocial Security Boards of Trustees (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), Table4, p. 6; U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 1982 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Sur 
vivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), Table 20, p. 51.
a. Based on Social Security Administration and Health Care Financing Administration estimates of impact of H.R. 4961, "Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982" on operations of the OASI, DI and HI Trust Funds under Intermediate Assumptions II-B of the 1982 
Trustees Report, which were adjusted for OASI and DI to reflect the actual 7.4 percent benefit increase for 1982. The estimated operations for 
OASI, OASDI, and OASDHI and HI combined in 1983 and later are theoretical since, following the expiration of the present law interfund bor 
rowing authority, the OASI Trust Fund would become depleted in July 1983 when assets would become insufficient to pay benefits when due. 
Authority for interfund borrowing among the OASI, DI and HI Trust Funds through December 31, 1982 was provided under H.R. 4331. The 
interfund borrowing provisions are contained in section 201(1) of the Social Security Act.
b. The income figures for 1982, and the end-of-year asset figures for 1982 and later, reflect the transfer of funds from the DI and HI Trust 
Funds to the OASI Trust Fund under the interfund borrowing authority provided by Public Law 97-123. Under Intermediate Assumptions II-B 
a total of $11.7 billion would be transferred to OASI in 1982, $6.2 billion from DI and $5.5 billion from HI. 




Comparison of Projections for Change 
in Selected Economic Variables, 1981-1984
Selected variables

























































































SOURCES: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administra 
tion, 1982 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), Table 10, 
p. 32; Chase Econometrics, U.S. Macroeconomic Forecasts and Analysis, Table 1.1, 1.2, 
17.3, pp. D-l, D-2, D-33, D-34; Data Resources Inc., Review of the U.S. Economy, Table 
10.4, p. 1.72: Wharton EFA, Inc., "The Wharton Quarterly Model," Table 1, p. 1. 
a. The difference between the percentage increase in average annual wages in covered 
employment and the percentage increase in the annual CPI.
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prices and wages, but are consistently more optimistic for the 
unemployment rate. 12 If, indeed, the unemployment rate 
averages one-half to 1 percent higher than the Trustees 
predicted, the financial picture will be bleaker than the 
estimates shown in table 4. Hence, any package of reforms 
designed to restore short-run financial solvency must provide 
enough of a cushion to enable the funds to pay benefits on a 
timely basis even if the economic conditions turn out to be 
worse than those anticipated in the 1982 Trustees' report.
Financing Options in the Short Run
The options for restoring financial balance to the social 
security program fall into three categories: benefit reduc 
tions, tax increases, or transfers from general revenues. 
Since even an extension of interfund borrowing can insure 
the timely benefit payments only through mid-1984, 
legislative action is needed immediately.
Benefit Reductions. While no one would advocate abrupt 
changes in the level of social security benefits, several pro 
posals are being advanced to modify the way in which 
benefits are increased to maintain a recipient's standard of 
living. Some of the specific options for indexing changes are 
listed in table 6, and estimates prepared by the Congressional 
Budget Office indicate that the savings over the next three 
years would range from about $7 billion for a permanent 
shift in the cost-of-living adjustment from July to October to 
$21 billion for eliminating the cost-of-living increase 
scheduled for July 1983.
In addition to the obvious need for revenues, many argue 
that reductions in cost-of-living adjustments are justified as 
an offset to what they believe has been overindexing of social 
security benefits in the last few years. The overindexing is at 
tributable to a soon-to-be corrected flaw in the CPI that 
gives excessive weight to mortgage interest rates and housing
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prices, components that have risen more rapidly than other 
prices in the recent past. If cost-of-living adjustments had 
been computed using an index that included a rental 
equivalence measure of housing costs, for example, benefits 
would now be 5 to 6 percent lower. 13
Table 6
Social Security Outlay Savings




Proposal_____1983 1984 1985 1983-1985
Eliminate 1983 COLA $2.2 $9.2 $9.5 $20.9 
Delay COLAs from
July to October 2.2 2.1 2.8 7.1 
Cap COLAs at 4 percent 0.6 2.7 4.4 7.7 
Set COLAs at growth
in wages minus 1.5
percentage points8____0.2____0.9____0.9_____2.0
SOURCE: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, "Statement by Alice M. Rivlin before the 
National Commission on Social Security Reform," mimeographed (August 20, 1982), 
Table 4, p. 11.
a. This option would result in small savings in outlays in the short run because of projected 
low productivity growth. Over the longer run, however, outlays could be either higher or 
lower than under current law, depending upon the relative behavior of wages and prices.
However, even if a rental equivalence measure of housing 
cost had been used, benefit increases would still have 
outstripped the growth in wages in the last five years. Hence, 
many argue that social security beneficiaries have received a 
degree of protection from the effects of inflation that has not 
been available to the wage earner. Thus, a reduction in 
future cost-of-living adjustments is viewed by some as a 
means of equalizing the treatment of workers and retirees.
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The disadvantage, of course, is that reductions in current 
law cost-of-living adjustments lower the real value of social 
security benefits over time. Such a reduction would increase 
the incidence of poverty among the aged, particularly the 
very old, and among the disabled.
Tax Increases. A second option that would improve social 
security trust fund balances would be to increase taxes. 
Three separate approaches are available: (1) move forward 
the effective date of scheduled payroll tax increases; (2) ex 
tend coverage to federal workers and the 30 percent of state- 
local employees not currently covered by social security; or 
(3) tax a portion of social security benefits under the per 
sonal income tax.
Payroll tax rate increases are scheduled under current law 
for 1985, 1986 and 1990. According to the CBO, moving the 
1985 and 1986 rate increases to January 1, 1984 would 
generate an additional $17 billion by the end of 1985. Mov 
ing all three scheduled increases to 1984 would generate $46 
billion (see table 7).
Extending coverage to some or all of those workers not 
currently covered by social security is another way of in 
creasing taxes. Full and immediate coverage of all non- 
covered government employees would produce about $46 
billion by 1985. However, such a move may not be practical 
for political and constitutional reasons. Therefore, a more 
modest proposal such as extending coverage only to federal 
civil service employees may be more realistic.
The third approach would be to subject a portion of social 
security benefits probably the half that is generally 
associated with the employer share of the payroll tax to the 
personal income tax and to direct the $18 billion in new 
receipts over the next three years to the social security trust 
funds. Taxing benefits is equivalent, of course, to a benefit
Table 7




_______________Proposal8________________1983 1984 1985 1983-1985
Payroll tax rate increase
a. Move 1985 and 1986 increases to January 1, 1984 - $10.8 $6.2 $17.0 
b. Move 1985, 1986, and 1990 increases to January 1, 1984 - 22.8 23.3 46.1
Extend Social Security coverage to federal, state and local 
government employees
a. New employees only $0.5 1.8 3.4 5.7 
b. All employees 11.1 16.3 18.2 45.6
Tax 50 percent of OASI benefits5 4.5 6.5 7.0 18.0
Tax 50 percent of OASI benefits for recipients with income 
above $20,000 (individual)/$25,000 (couples)5 1.2 1.8 2.2 5.2
SOURCE: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, "Statement by Alice M. Rivh'n before the National Commission on Social Security Reform,"
mimeographed (August 20, 1982), Table 5, p. 15.
a. Unless otherwise indicated, the effective date is January 1, 1983.
b. These estimates assume that the trust funds would receive the added revenues as income tax liabilities accrued, rather than when the income
taxes were actually paid. Estimates are preliminary and subject to revision.
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cut, but this approach would protect the poor elderly who do 
not pay taxes. Further protection could be gained for 
moderate income beneficiaries by imposing taxes only on 
those with incomes above a given level, such as $20,000 for 
an individual and $25,000 for a couple as in the taxation of 
unemployment benefits. While most experts acknowledge 
the desirability of taxing benefits, political opposition is so 
vehement that observers believe the proposal has little 
chance of success.
General Revenues. The third possible approach to increase 
social security revenues would be to transfer some funds 
from other parts of the budget. Such a transfer would, of 
course, require either an increase in other taxes, a reduction 
in other expenditures or a rise in the federal deficit.
The arguments for and against general revenue financing 
for social security rest in large part on one's view of the 
philosophical rationale of the social security program and its 
intended effect on the distribution of income. Some argue 
that social security is best construed as an annual tax- 
transfer program, which redistributes income from the 
relatively affluent wage earners to the relatively poor retired. 
The more common perspective sees social security in a 
lifetime framework, where payroll taxes are considered com 
pulsory saving for retirement.
The annual view that social security is part of the federal 
government's tax and transfer schemes leads to an evalua 
tion of the tax independent of the benefits, with the conclu 
sion that the payroll tax clearly violates the ability-to-pay 
criterion for equitable taxation. The tax is levied without 
provision for the number of dependents, excludes income 
from capital, and exempts wages over the maximum. Ad 
vocates of the annual tax-transfer perspective would favor a 
more progressive source of revenue to finance social securi 
ty. General revenues, most of which are derived from the
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personal income tax, would be preferable on distributional 
grounds, since the income tax includes unearned as well as 
earned income in the tax base, applies progressive rates, and 
makes allowance for dependents.
In contrast, many argue that the present program is best 
understood as a lifetime compulsory saving program in 
which people are forced to save during their working years in 
exchange for guaranteed income in retirement. In this 
perspective, where benefits and taxes are considered jointly, 
the payroll tax (with an earned credit for low-wage workers) 
can be seen as an appropriate method of financing a com 
pulsory saving program.
Since the present social security system is a compromise 
between a strictly wage-related saving scheme and a program 
of income redistribution, it could be argued that a rationale 
exists for supplementing payroll tax receipts with general 
revenues. And indeed, several precedents exist for the use of 
general revenues within the social security system, such as 
the gratuitous wage credit granted to servicemen, transi 
tional benefits for certain uninsured people, and general 
revenue financing of some hospital payments.
Two quite different groups have argued against the in 
troduction of general revenues. One group, comprising peo 
ple associated with social security during its formative years, 
argues that a switch to general revenue financing might mean 
a break in the perceived link between individual contribu 
tions and benefits, thereby creating a situation where social 
security might be transformed into a means-tested program. 
This argument may have lost some of its force, however, 
since the principles of social security may now be well 
enough established for the program to withstand an infusion 
of general revenues without undermining the earned-right 
aspect.
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More recent opposition to the use of general revenues 
stems from those who fear there would be more of a tenden 
cy to expand social security without the countervailing con 
stituency created by the payroll tax. This view reflects the 
judgment that increases in social security benefits should 
have a low priority because of the more pressing needs for 
general revenues. The argument that general revenues should 
be used to finance the non-wage-related components of the 
program is also not very compelling to those who feel that 
the program should be divested of its welfare function and 
that benefits should be based primarily on the earnings 
record of each participant.
A limited use of general revenues has been advocated 
repeatedly in the form of the proposal to transfer all or some 
of the financing of hospital insurance to general revenues 
and credit the scheduled increases in the HI tax rate to the 
OASDI funds. 14 Since hospital insurance benefits bear no 
direct relation to contributions or earnings in covered 
employment none of the program's underlying philosophies 
would be violated. However, opposition exists even to this 
limited proposal, because opponents fear that such a move 
might lessen the incentive to control the rapidly increasing 
costs of Medicare.
Summary
Establishing social security on a sound financial footing 
must be given a high priority in the next year. In view of the 
experience of underestimation of program costs during the 
last decade, the choice among solutions should be made at 
least partly according to the criterion that the program be 
sure of avoiding financial crises in the future. The pay-as- 
you-go nature of the program requires that workers whose 
taxes are supporting current retirees be certain of receiving 
benefits when they retire, a confidence that will be stronger if 
the program's ability to pay next year's benefits is not con 
tinually in doubt.
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IV. Long-Run Financing Problems 
and Options: 2014-2060
The large deficits projected for social security as the baby 
boom population retires in the first half of the 21st century 
confront policymakers with fundamental decisions about the 
future of the program. The options include raising taxes to 
maintain current benefit levels for a significantly larger aged 
population or reducing benefits in an effort to avoid major 
cost increases. Benefits can be lowered either through across- 
the-board reductions in the replacement rate or through ex 
tending the age at which workers are eligible for full benefits.
The Problem in Perspective
According to the 1982 Trustees' Report, under the most 
reasonable economic and mortality assumptions, the cost of 
the Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance portion of 
the social security program is projected to rise from the cur 
rent level of 11 percent of taxable payrolls to about 17 in the 
year 2030, remaining at that level through 2060 (see table 8, 
II-B). The sharp increase in costs reflects the changing 
demographic structure of the population. The ratio of the 
beneficiary population to covered workers is projected to 
rise dramatically as the sizeable post-World War II baby 
boom starts reaching retirement age after 2010. At that time, 
the working population will be composed of the relatively 
small group born during the period of low fertility that 
began in the late 1960s. Assuming that the fertility rate will 
rise gradually from the current level of 1.8 to a long-run rate 
of 2.1, the Social Security Administration projects that the 
number of beneficiaries per 100 covered workers will rise 
from 31 in 1982 to 50 by 2030, an increase of about 60 per 
cent (see table 9). Since the social security program is financ 
ed on a pay-as-you-go basis, with tax contributions by 
today's workers paying for benefits to today's beneficiaries,
Table 8
Long-Run Projected Costs of the Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Trust Funds
as a Percentage of Taxable Payroll, Under Alternative Assumptions3
Selected Years, 1982-2060
___Projected costs as percent of taxable payrolls under assumption___ OASDI tax rates
Optimistic Intermediate Pessimistic scheduled under






























































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 1982 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of 
the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), Table 29, pp. 67-68. 


























the projected increase in the aged population relative to the 
working population implies a similar increase in OASDI cost 
from 11 to 17 percent of taxable payroll.
Table 9
Projected Beneficiaries per Hundred Covered Workers
Under Alternative Assumptions8
Selected Years, 1982-2060























































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administra 
tion, 1982 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (GPO, 1982), Table 28, pp. 65-66. 
a. The long-run ultimate levels of fertility under the alternative assumptions are;
Optimistic _____Intermediate_____ Pessimistic 
I________II-A_______II-B________III
Fertility 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.7
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Many view a combined employer-employee tax rate of 
roughly 17 percent as simply "too high," and considerable 
effort is currently directed toward devising alternative 
schemes to reduce long-run costs. The high rate, however, 
does not mean that the social security program will be any 
more generous in the future than it is today, but rather 
reflects the fact that after the turn of the century there will be 
a very large dependent aged population. These elderly and 
disabled people must receive support from some 
source either social security, direct transfers from their 
children, private pension benefits or their own saving. Since 
the burden of a large dependent aged population is in 
escapable, a reduction in social security benefits may well 
lead to greater required expenditures for the elderly and 
disabled through other programs.
Moreover, those concerned about a combined employee 
and employer social security tax rate of 17 percent during the 
next century often ignore the fact that lower fertility results 
in fewer children per worker. If the economic burden on ac 
tive workers is measured in terms of total dependents rather 
than just aged retirees, then the picture looks quite different. 
The total dependency ratio (the ratio of the number of peo 
ple under age 20 and over age 65 per 100 people age 20-64) 
will be lower in the 21st century than it was in 1965 (see table 
10). The rise in the aged will be more than offset by a decline 
in dependent children, thereby freeing resources which could 
be devoted to providing for the elderly.
Finally, while a projected tax rate of 17 percent represents 
a 60 percent increase over the current levy, it is considerably 
below the present payroll tax rates in many European coun 
tries. Austria, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands all have 
rates for programs comparable to OASDI in excess of 20 
percent of payroll. West Germany with 18 percent also 
already has a rate that exceeds the rate projected for the
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United States as the baby boom retires after the turn of the 
century (see table 11).
Table 10
Actual Past and Projected Future Dependency Ratios 
Selected Years, 1930-2060*

























































SOURCES: U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Aging, Hearings before the Sub 
committee on Retirement Income and Employment, Social Security, "Statement of Robert 
M. Ball," 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 111. U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser 
vices, Social Security Administration, 1982 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the 
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), Table Al, p. 79.
a. The dependency ratio is the total number of people under 20 and over 64 per 100 people 
aged 20 to 64.
Once the projected cost increases for social security are 
placed in perspective, maintaining current benefit levels and 
raising the payroll tax becomes a reasonable option. The 
alternative is to lower future costs by reducing benefits.
Table 11
Employee-Employer Tax Rates by Type of Program 
Selected Countries, 1981


























































































on a comparable basis
5.35 10.70
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Office of International Policy, unpublished data.
a. Excludes work injury insurance.
b. Invalidity pensions financed through sickness insurance.
c. Invalidity and survivors benefits financed through sickness insurance.
d. Disability insurance also includes work-injury compensation. to tovo
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Proposals to Reduce the Long-Run Deficit
Two major approaches have been proposed to reduce 
long-run social security costs lowering replacement rates 
and extending the retirement age.
Lowering Replacement Rates. The specific suggestions for 
reducing replacement rates include the proposal by the 1976 
Consultant Panel on Social Security13 to index the benefit 
formula by prices rather than wages and the Reagan Ad 
ministration's proposal to make a one-time ad hoc adjust 
ment in the benefit formula.
The price indexing proposal involves reducing replacement 
rates by changing the method for adjusting the benefit for 
mula. As noted earlier, the current formula consists of three 
brackets which apply declining percentages to increasing 
amounts of the worker's average indexed monthly earnings 
(AIME). The amounts separating the individual's AIME in 
to intervals, that is, $230 and $1,388 in 1982, are called 
"bend points." Under current law, these bend points are in 
creased automatically each year to reflect the growth in 
average wages. By adjusting the formula in this fashion, 
replacement rates remain constant over time. In other words, 
a worker with a history of average earnings retiring in the 
year 1990 will receive a benefit equal to the same percentage 
of his pre-retirement wages as a similarly situated worker 
retiring today. In contrast, if the bend points in the social 
security benefit formula were adjusted by prices rather than 
wages, the progressivity of the benefit structure would lead 
to lower replacement rates for future generations of workers 
as they moved up into higher real earnings brackets.
While the price indexing proposal would substantially cut 
costs, it would also create significant hardship for tomor 
row's elderly. The problem arises because the rationale for 
price indexing is based on two fundamental assumptions, 
both of which are questionable.
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The first assumption is that people's absolute level of real 
income rather than their position in the income distribution 
determines acceptable and desired standards of living. For 
example, under price indexing, a worker in 2060 with annual 
pre-retirement earnings of $15,000 in 1982 dollars would be 
assumed to have the same spending and saving habits and, 
therefore, retirement needs as a worker retiring today with 
earnings of $15,000; therefore, the worker retiring in 2060 
would be given the same real pension amount as a worker 
retiring today. In fact, a worker retiring in 2060 will not have 
the same spending and saving habits as the worker earning 
the same real income today because he will be much poorer 
relative to the average.
The second assumption is that lower replacement rates in 
the future will be acceptable since individuals will be much 
better off, save more on their own and receive much greater 
private pension benefits. In fact, lower paid workers are 
simply not able to save for retirement since their incomes are 
barely adequate to cover current consumption. Even middle 
income workers are unlikely to undertake retirement saving 
because the widespread myopia with respect to retirement 
needs that provided the initial justification for the social 
security program will in all likelihood persist.
At first blush, a new emphasis on private pension plans 
may seem an appealing alternative to substantial increases in 
the payroll tax. Private pension benefits have increased 
dramatically as a source of retirement income, and private 
plans may meet a larger portion of the income needs for 
some groups of future retirees. The private pension system 
should not be viewed as a panacea, however, since it is 
plagued with problems of its own. The private system is in 
capable of offsetting the impact of inflation or of protecting 
workers who change jobs frequently. Moreover, less than 
half of the private nonfarm workforce is currently covered 
by private plans and pension benefits are concentrated
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among highly paid people; low-wage workers receive almost 
no private pension benefits.
Because industries with traditionally high pension 
coverage, such as manufacturing (see table 12), are expected 
to employ a declining share of workers, the percentage of the 
workforce covered by pension plans is not expected to in 
crease significantly in the future. The people without pension 
coverage will continue to be primarily lower paid employees, 
precisely those people who are incapable of saving on their 
own. For these individuals, social security will remain the 
sole source of support in retirement. Lowering social security 
replacement rates for these workers through price indexing, 
on the assumption that such a reduction will be acceptable 
because they will have higher real incomes, will simply force 
a substantial portion of future retirees to suffer a dramatic 
decline in economic well-being upon retirement.
Most of the problems associated with reducing replace 
ment rates by price indexing are equally applicable to lower 
ing benefit levels through a one-time adjustment of the bend 
points in the benefit formula. 16 The only factor in favor of 
an ad hoc adjustment is predictability so that corporations 
and the pension industry will know the level of protection to 
be provided by social security in order to establish mean 
ingful private pension benefits and realistic integration pro 
visions. Under the price indexing proposal future replace 
ment rates are not predictable but rather depend on the rate 
of growth of real wages. For example, in the absence of pro 
ductivity growth, replacement rates would remain constant 
for the average worker; with positive real wage growth they 
would decline; and with price increases in excess of wage 
growth, as has been the case in the last few years, replace 
ment rates would actually rise.
The advantage of price indexing over an ad hoc adjust 
ment is that it allows for a more gradual reduction in replace-
233
ment rates. Avoiding abrupt changes in the level of benefits 
is essential in order to provide people with enough time to 
revise their saving plans in response to the lower levels of 
replacement under social security. Lowering replacement 
rates, however, either through price indexing or by adjusting 
the benefit formula may be an inferior option to extending 
the age at which individuals are eligible for full benefits.
Table 12
The Percentage of All Workers Covered by a Pension Plan 
































SOURCE: President's Commission on Pension Policy, Coming of Age: Toward a National 
Retirement Income Policy (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), Table 
11, p. 27.
Extending the Retirement Age. While 65 was the most ac 
ceptable age for retirement when social security was 
established in 1935, dramatic changes in the characteristics 
of the elderly population and the economy argue for 
postponing retirement past age 65 in the 21st century. 
Tomorrow's elderly will have improved life expectancy, bet 
ter health, and more education than those retiring today. 
Older workers will also be in greater demand as the growth in 
the labor force slows and as an increasing proportion of
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employment is generated by the service industries where the 
work is less physically stressful.
Although most of the startling gains in life expectancy 
during this century are attributable to a substantial reduction 
in neonatal mortality and elimination of childhood diseases, 
the life expectancy of older workers has also increased 
significantly (see table 13). As a result, workers will have at 
least as many years left after age 68 during the first half of 
the next century as they did after age 65 in the early years of 
social security. Actuaries at the Social Security Administra 
tion recently calculated the retirement age that would be 
equivalent to retiring at age 65 in 1940. Under any of four 
measures, the 1980 equivalent to age 65 retirement was 69 
years and the 2000 equivalent was more than 71 years. 17
The projected health of tomorrow's elderly is equally as 
important as longevity in assessing their ability to work past 
age 65. Current studies reveal that a large majority of the 
elderly who are under 70 appear free of physically disabling 
limitations. 18 This may be attributable partly to the signifi 
cant progress that has been made in treating arthritis and 
cardiovascular diseases, two of the most serious barriers to 
good health at older ages. Most of the evidence indicates that 
increased life expectancy will be accompanied by a cor 
responding increase in the physical well-being of the aged. 19
Older workers after the turn of the century will also be bet 
ter educated than their counterparts today. The baby boom 
generation has already achieved a higher level of formal 
schooling than any previous generation. In 1979, about 85 
percent of those aged 22 to 29 had graduated from high 
school, compared to only 50 percent of the same age group 
in 1950 and 60 percent in 1960. Over half of those aged 25 to 
29 in 1979 had some college education, compared with less 
than 20 percent of the same age group in 1950. Improved 
education and training will enable them to adapt to the 
changing technological demands of the workplace. 20
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Table 13






























































SOURCES: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administra 
tion, Office of the Actuary, Social Security Area Population Projections, 1981, Actuarial 
Study no. 85 (July 1981), Table 18, p. 42; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, unpublished data, 
a. Intermediate alternative life expectancy rates.
b. Data based on the average of deaths over a three-year period, 1929-31, as a percentage of 
the population in the census year.
The changing conditions in the labor market will most 
likely lead also to an increased demand for older workers. 
The growth in the labor force will taper off at the turn of the 
century, since the low birth rates of today will result in con 
siderably fewer new workers. Unlike the past when the rapid 
growth in the supply of workers strained the nation's capaci 
ty to provide enough new jobs, the new environment should 
create a tight labor market where the experience and skill of 
older workers will be in increasing demand. Their employ 
ment will be further facilitated by the long term shift in the
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industrial structure from mining and manufacturing where 
health hazards are relatively high, to trade and services, 
where older workers can perform with less strain and threat 
to their health.
In recommending an increase in the retirement age, 
however, it is essential to remember that some older workers 
will not be able to engage in gainful employment past age 62 
and must have access to some form of income support. If 
they are prevented from working by physical disability, the 
appropriate way to provide for them is an expanded disabili 
ty insurance program. While current law makes some 
allowance for age in determining disability by applying a 
more liberal test to those aged 50 or older, more explicit 
recognition of the interaction of age and physical impair 
ment may be required.
In addition, some older workers may not be able to find 
jobs because they have been displaced by automation. These 
aged will not have access to disability insurance and may face 
a severe loss of income as a result of extending the social 
security retirement age. The changing characteristics of the 
workplace, however, indicate that the number of healthy 
unemployed aged may be quite small. While retraining older 
workers is generally considered impractical today, restruc 
turing jobs for older employees may become economical in 
the tight labor markets forecasted after the turn of the cen 
tury. However, it may be necessary to establish an expanded 
unemployment insurance program for older workers.
The issues raised by the older disabled worker and the 
worker displaced by technology highlight the potential 
dangers in raising the age at which full social security 
benefits are available. Unless some provision is made for 
these workers, the costs of later retirement will be borne by 
the most disadvantaged aged. Expanding the disability pro 
gram, however, necessarily reduces the cost savings of ex-
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tending the retirement age. After adjusting for increased 
disability outlays, proposals which involve a gradual increase 
of the retirement age from 65 to 68 yield a long term reduc 
tion in costs of about 1 percent of taxable payroll. 21 The ma 
jor reductions would come after the turn of the century when 
the new retirement pattern would lead to a cost saving of 
about 1.6 percent of taxable payroll. With the retirement age 
at 68 rather than 65, costs in the year 2030 would be 15.4 
rather than 17 percent of taxable payroll.
Summary
A large dependent elderly population creates an in 
escapable burden which is reflected in the required increase 
in the social security tax to about 17 percent of payroll after 
the turn of the century. The first question is whether to 
schedule future tax increases to cover these costs or to reduce 
benefits as the baby boom generation retires. If benefits are 
to be lowered, a second question is whether to reduce 
replacement rates or extend the retirement age. Several 
arguments can be marshalled for maintaining current benefit 
levels and raising taxes. (1) Higher social security taxes in the 
next century will be offset by a decline in the resources re 
quired for the clothing, feeding and education of children. 
(2) The scheduled tax rates, while high by current U.S. stan 
dards, are actually lower than the current payroll tax levy in 
many European countries. (3) Finally, if the large elderly 
dependent population is not supported through social securi 
ty, the working population will probably end up providing 
equivalent support through some other program, in light of 
the historical inability of people to save for retirement and 
the inadequacies of the private pension system.
We may be unwilling, however, to commit the working 
population in the 21st century to transferring 17 percent of 
their payroll to the retired and disabled. In that case the 
relative merits of alternative approaches to reducing long-
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run costs become important. The improved life expectancy 
and health of the elderly and the likelihood of increased 
pressure for older workers to remain in the labor force argue 
for raising the retirement age, provided that expanded 
disability benefits are available for those too incapacitated to 
work. The alternative of lowering replacement rates in a 
society where only half the workers have private pension 
coverage will cause a significant portion of workers, primari 
ly those with low earnings, to suffer a disastrous decline in 
income after retirement.
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